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The Smiler Incident - What Happened
AndrewH
TS Member
I agree that it shouldn't have happened but the human brain is a strange creature. We always look for patterns in everything (even if it is at a subconscious level) so they may well have looked at the monitors but if you don't expect to see something (and I recall hearing that, that part is in a bit of a CCTV 'blind spot' in that it is quite hard to see but not impossible) then you probably won't see it. Brining it back to your analogy of the fire alarm no one runs in panic from the building when they hear the fire alarm because they do not believe it is a fire (as that is the pattern their brain sees).If this is the case then that's shocking.
Saying that they had errors allday and made the decision to just "override" again on that doomed train, due to the fact they thought it was another false error is mind blowing.
False or not you take every precaution.
You hear a fire alarm, no initial awareness of a drill?....you evacuate.
Don't just reset assuming it's an error.
I agree that it shouldn't have happened but the human brain is a strange creature. We always look for patterns in everything (even if it is at a subconscious level) so they may well have looked at the monitors but if you don't expect to see something (and I recall hearing that, that part is in a bit of a CCTV 'blind spot' in that it is quite hard to see but not impossible) then you probably won't see it. Brining it back to your analogy of the fire alarm no one runs in panic from the building when they hear the fire alarm because they do not believe it is a fire (as that is the pattern their brain sees).
But this is where Alton Towers (Merlin) should have had robust systems in place to try to mitigate against the human decisions and error (I say mitigate, you'll never 100% eliminate)
The ride systems were working as designed and within UK and EU rules. It's when the humans got involved that things went wrong. If the ride had been giving false errors all day then one can perhaps understand how the ride ops and maintenance may have cleared an error and re-started the ride on the assumption of another false alarm. This is the Human Factors another poster referred to.
Hingsight is 20/20, but it's not hard to now envisage how this could have been stopped. There's already been a number of good suggestions. But how about a simple procedure.... "After a ride has e-stopped, staff must visually confirm the location of ALL operating cars before restarting the ride". You have a simple piece of paper where you get two staff to sign that each car is accounted for. Costs peanuts too.
This is Safety Mangement. Nearly all industries involving public safety have it. Alton Towers must do too. But, it seems they weren't up to scratch. And this is the shocking thing. And this is why in all likelihood it's going to be a big fine. And to be perfectly honest it absolutely should be.
Long time lurker first poster btw... Enjoyed reading for a long time
MaxPower
TS Member
Although I applaud Merlin in the way they've dealt with this whole situation and shouldered the blame for it (Not that they had a choice), there is only so much blame that can be aimed at processes (or lack of in this case).
The fact that every member of staff in the area failed to report the stalled train to the Smiler ops is one of the most worrying things about the whole incident, however, this is just an assumption on my part.
I guess we'll never know all the ins and outs of what happened.
The fact that every member of staff in the area failed to report the stalled train to the Smiler ops is one of the most worrying things about the whole incident, however, this is just an assumption on my part.
I guess we'll never know all the ins and outs of what happened.
DiogoJ42
TS Member
From what I've heard, at least one staff member attempted to do just this, but..... [I shall stop there before I post something libelous]The fact that every member of staff in the area failed to report the stalled train to the Smiler ops is one of the most worrying things about the whole incident, however, this is just an assumption on my part.
Ok stupid question of the day!
Whose responsibility is it for making sure that the op can make a clear judgement when a ride stalls? I mean a visual verification as well as the initial equipment notification.
Manufacturer or park?
The equipment worked correctly , yes! Informed the op there was an issue. The equipment would have told the op where the issue was ie between which blocks. Then comes the human element, someone needs to make that decision to override.
If(how I read it) that the person or ppl overriding it did not have sufficient information (visual) to make a clear decision, then whose responsible? Park or manufacturer?
What am I trying to blurb on about is how does a ride pass its initial h&s tests without the op having a full visual on ALL of the track.
This has been picked up now but why wasn't it picked up before?
Whose responsibility is it for making sure that the op can make a clear judgement when a ride stalls? I mean a visual verification as well as the initial equipment notification.
Manufacturer or park?
The equipment worked correctly , yes! Informed the op there was an issue. The equipment would have told the op where the issue was ie between which blocks. Then comes the human element, someone needs to make that decision to override.
If(how I read it) that the person or ppl overriding it did not have sufficient information (visual) to make a clear decision, then whose responsible? Park or manufacturer?
What am I trying to blurb on about is how does a ride pass its initial h&s tests without the op having a full visual on ALL of the track.
This has been picked up now but why wasn't it picked up before?
I would say that all coasters have to be designed to accommodate a stall of some sort. I guess it becomes a failure when the stall keeps happening. With regards the Smiler, as we know, the train was frequently stalling there during testing and the early days which Alton put down to having to test different wheels.....